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On Game Theory and the Law

Kenneth Dau-Schmidt
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Robert H. Heidt

Eric Rasmusen
Michael Alexeev*

Douglas Baird, Robert Gertner, & Randall Picker, Game Theory
and the Law. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994.
xii + 330 pages. $45.00.

18 January 1996 the Indiana University Law and EcoOn
nomics Lunch Bunch' met to discuss the book Game Theory and
the Law by Douglas Baird, Robert Gertner, and Randall Picker.
Professor Dau-Schmidt wanted to review the book and, being
rather a strong believer in social cooperation, thought a group
effort would be a good idea. The rest of us, being eager to express our opinions, agreed.
Dau-Schmidt: I want to read a section from the preface of the
book that sets forth the purposes the authors had in mind,
and then ask your responses.
Address correspondence to Kenneth Dau-Schmidt, Indiana University School of
Law-Bloomington, 211 S. Indiana Avenue, Bloomington, IN 47405 (e-mail:
KenDauSchmidt@Law.Indiana.edu).
1 The Indiana University Law and Economics Lunch Bunch is a group of scholars at
Indiana University who meet each Thursday to enjoy each other's company and discuss
problems in the economic analysis of law. Dau-Schmidt, Heidt, and Stake are law professors. Dau-Schmidt's research centers on labor and employment law, Heidt's on tort law,
and Stake's on property and family law. Alexeev is in the economics department, and
specializes in transitional economies. Rasmusen is in the business school, and writes on a
bit of everything, but is best known for his own game theory book. All participants have
broad interests, which is why the lunch group is successful. One might describe DauSchmidt as liberal law-and-econ, Alexeev as standard if Moscow-born economist, Heidt as
ex-Marxist diehard Chicagoan, Rasmusen as MIT-Chicago fusion middlebrow economic
theorist, and Stake as extreme middle-of-the-roader. Everybody is tenured and in midcareer. You must imagine Aexeev with a rich Russian accent.
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This book rests on the premise that game theory can
offer insights to those who want to understand how
laws affect the way people behave.... First we wanted
to introduce the formal tools of modem game theory
to a wide audience.... Second, and as important, we
wanted to show how modem game theory allows us to
sharpen our intuitions and provides us with new ways
of looking at familiar problems. In short, we have
tried to write a book that offers those interested in law
a new way of thinking about legal rules, and a book
that shows those interested in game theory a fertile
and largely unexplored domain in which its tools have
many applications. (P. xi).
The book goes on to describe a variety of game-theoretic
tools, including the normal form of a game, the extensive
form of a game, modeling imperfect information, signaling,
screening, reputation, repeated games, collective action
problems, noncooperative bargaining, and bargaining and
information problems; and then it applies these game-theoretic tools to a variety of legal problems, among them tort
theory, contract law, antitrust law, bankruptcy law, employment law, and labor law.
Have the authors succeeded in their purposes? Mike?
Alexeev: To some extent they did, and to some extent they did
not. My impression was that the book was written mostly for
lawyers. I think that the authors succeeded in demonstrating
the usefulness of game theory to people who do not have any
previous exposure to game theory. The authors present a
number of simple, but useful, applications to legal doctrine
including tort law, antitrust, and labor and employment law.
But the book does not really show a "fertile and largely unexplored domain" of applications to game theorists and economists. Most of the book's material comes from economics articles, and even the trial cases are mostly the cases that have
already been discussed in the economics literature, so the
book is much less useful for the economists or game theorists
in particular. But I enjoyed reading it, and I think it will be
useful for lawyers.
Dau-Schmidt: Eric?
Rasmusen: I agree that it may be most useful for people in law
who would like to see applications of game theory to particular areas of law. A tort expert might want to read the chapter
on torts for its descriptions and numerical examples demonstrating how particular game theory models can be applied to
tort law. The book is weaker as a general reference for somebody who's in a hurry to find something. Although the index
and glossary2 are good, the structure isn't convenient for ref2 The book has an 18-page glossary to assist initiates in the technical language of
game theory.
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erence. This isn't a mathematical book, but it is a dense one
which requires careful reading. 3
Stake: The authors are quite successful in showing how game theory can provide marvelous counterintuitive insights. But I'm
not confident that my law students could slog through the
material without some help. I found the book challenging to
read, for two opposing reasons. There are portions that are
overexplained, even for lawyers. On the other hand, there
were places where the explanation seemed thin. For example, it was not immediately obvious to me where the authors
got the two sides of the inequality on page 169. It turns out
that the same formula was used for both sides, but one side
had already been simplified. One more sentence in the text
would have saved me some time and effort. However, the examples are so illuminating it is worth the reader's time to
work through them.
Dau-Schmidt: Bob, what did you think?
Heidt Ken, consider the authors' first goal-"to introduce the
formal tools of modem game theory to a wide audience." I'm
thinking, How wide? The book is very kind to people who are
paralyzed by charts, because throughout the authors take the
reader's hand in explaining how one should interpret a
chart. And they end up explaining what the chart shows. But,
on the other hand, the book isn't written with the muscularity that a lot of legal writing displays and that legal scholars
expect. The book also presents traps for the sophisticated
reader. If I were to give this to someone who was going to
teach law and economics, I would need to warn them, say, on
the torts section. I brought with me Steve Shavell's Economic
Analysis of Accident Law (1989), which not only is more thorough in its analysis of tort law but, more significantly, reaches
different conclusions, and challenges what the authors have
to say in this text.
Just how wide an audience? Not as wide, I bet, as the authors hoped.
Alexeev: To some extent, I would have to disagree with Bob. The
ostensible goal of the book is to introduce game-theoretic
reasoning and thinking to a certain audience. I think they
succeeded in this, even in torts. They did present the main
problems, but they had to omit quite a few things.
Dau-Schniidt: I would agree with Michael that the authors have
been successful in introducing the formal tools of modem
game theory but primarily to a legal audience, for example,
law professors who have some introduction to law and economics and who are interested in finding out about game
3 The reader should perhaps know that Rasmusen has also written a book on game
theory, though without a focus on law: see Rasmusen 1994.
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theory. The legal doctrine is fairly rudimentary, so if you're a
game theorist interested in legal problems, there's not as
much for you in this book.
Jeff raised the question of whether or not you could use
this book in a course. I am planning to use it in my law and
economics seminar not because it is a particularly good
course book, but because I think it is currently the best book
of its kind.
My primary criticism is that the authors do not go far
enough in advocating a game-theoretic analysis of the law.
There were a lot of opportunities-for example, when they
discussed applications of game theory to antitrust lawwhere they could have talked about how game theory provides a superior model to traditional neoclassical economic
analysis. Under traditional analysis, you have a variety of basic
assumptions: people act rationally, perfect information, zero
transaction costs. Under game theory, you can relax some of
those assumptions. In fact, the point of game theory is to examine problems of imperfect information, strategic behavior,
or transaction costs. Where transaction costs and strategic behavior are important, game theory can provide a superior
model. Game theory isn'tjust loosey-goosey law and economics where the numbers are all integers and none of them are
over ten. It's a very useful method of addressing the real
modeling problems of imperfect information and strategic
behavior. I would also argue that game theory can provide
insights for discourses with other disciplines about the analy4
sis of the law.
Do others agree?
Alexeev: I think the authors should have provided a detailed discussion of the limitations of game theory much earlier in the
book than they actually did. They should have stressed the
fact that the outcomes or solutions to games depend so much
on the assumptions about information-who knows what and
when, and who moves when. Two modelers can model the
same problem differently and obtain very different results.
Game theory is most useful in providing the framework for
thinking about the issues rather than being able to predict
exact outcomes.
This brings me to another point the authors did not emphasize enough, although they did mention it a couple of
times: game-theoretic solutions often do not provide an answer about what will happen in real-world situations. It might
have been a good idea to present some experimental results
about which game-theoretic solutions are actually followed by
4 For further reading, see "Other Readings on Game Theory" at the end of this
article. Readings on the list provide links to anthropology, political science, and philosophy.
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people playing these games. This is particularly true about
refinements of Nash equilibria. 5 On several occasions, the authors simply introduced a refinement without stressing
enough that there might be other refinements, different solutions, and different real-world outcomes.
Dau-Schmidt: I'd have to agree. The authors did talk about the
problems, so we can't fault them too much. But with game
theory, once you start relaxing the assumption of perfect information, once you start taking account of strategic behavior, it does become possible to model to achieve almost any
result you want.
Empirical work becomes even more crucial. Since you can derive a model that reaches almost any conclusion, it becomes
very important to sort out empirically which models are useful and which aren't.
Rasmusen: Mike said a lot of interesting things, but I disagree
with his claim that game theory doesn't make predictions. It
does-.
Alexeev: Oh, it does. But are they correct?
Stake: Despite all I've learned about game theory from this book,
I don't have much confidence that when I return to my areas
of law I will be able to generate the models myself. What does
one look for first when making a model? The authors start
with the model and ask what numbers would make it work
out one way or another. They haven't shown me how to begin with a legal problem and develop an appropriate model.
Rasmusen: How to set up a model is perhaps the hardest thing to
teach in game theory-not the math or the technical details,
but discerning which assumptions to make in the first place.
A similar problem comes up in learning how to think like a
lawyer, in learning to brief a case. You need to limit your description to just the important details. A student may start off
by saying, "An American woman walked down the street and
was hit by a car." The listener is led to expect that the case
will turn on the nationality of the pedestrian, and if it does
not, the student has misled him. On the other hand, the description says nothing about the circumstances of the crash,
and so has omitted important details.
Similarly in game theory, some things matter and some
don't, but it is hard to teach students the difference. I find
this particularly true with numbers, because M.B.A. students,
at least, do not realize that numbers do not have to be exact
to be useful. If I set up a model in which Joe gets a profit of
$100,000 if his business succeeds, they say, "Why $100,000
rather than $110,000? They're very bothered by where the
5 A Nash equilibrium is a set of strategic choices in which no party can improve his

payoff by varying his strategy, given the strategies the other players are choosing (Rasmusen 1994:23).
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numbers come from, even though any value between $50,000
and $150,000 may lead to the same prediction. So some of
this is the problem in setting up the game, which I don't
think the authors here really make much attempt to teach.
Maybe that can't be taught from a book.
This is important forJeff's point about sometimes missing
the bigger-picture game, because there are three things they
tend to leave out-three things very surprising for people
and private
from Chicago: market forces, government failure,
6
failure.
market
with
dealing
for
institutions
An example in this book is a model in which workers
have good or bad backs, and the employer has to decide
whether to train each worker or not without knowing about
his individual health status (pp. 125-46). The authors describe the market wonderfully well and do a good job of explaining the complicated things that happen in the analysis,
which leads ultimately to the conclusion that the government
may need to compel the employer to provide training. 7 A
crucial assumption, though, is that the payoffs are set up at
the start so that the workers get a lot more benefit from training than employers do. If those assumptions do not hold, a
different outcome would result.
Stake: Related to that, I would have liked to have seen a few
more-and I think Ken hinted at this-comparisons to the
conclusions classical economics would reach. How does game
theory add to what has been done in law and economics for
30 years? The reader who doesn't know much about law;-and
the reader who doesn't know much about game theory,
might also not know too much about traditional law and economics and might benefit from a comparison.
Heidt: Am I hearing a consensus that the authors have been too
modest about the policy implications of game theory?
Michael said something that almost suggests that he thought
they were too ambitious, but...
Alexeev: . . . It's not always clear, because often they did not
forcefully present the real-world policy implications.
Dau-Schmidt: I'd agree with that. As you said, Bob, the writing is
not very muscular in comparison with other legal writing. It's
couched in terms of "may" a lot of times. I saw "may" all
through this book.
The height of this problem is when they discuss the Du
Pont caseS-the case in which Du Pont built enough capacity
to produce titanium dioxide to supply all current and future
6 All three authors are faculty members at the University of Chicago; Baird and
Picker are in the Law School, where Baird is now Dean, and Gertner is a professor in the
Graduate School of Business.
7 For further discussion of the bad back example, see Prof. Stake's comments below.
8 E. I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. FTC (1980).
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anticipated demand for the compound. The court found that
such expansion was not an "unfair method of competition"
under the Federal Trade Commission Act. The authors discuss how this case might be an example of a company expanding in order to preclude others from entering the market. They go through a fairly long and interesting discussion
about how this case could be an example of preclusive
growth, and then when they get to the end, they hedge their
bets and say, "Well this growth could well have occurred anyway because of economies of scale" (p. 175).9 I suppose they
need to point out that there are other possible views of this
case, but I would have liked to have seen them take a
stronger position, that: "Yes, this is an example of preclusive
growth; here's a model of this phenomenon; the Court was
wrong. Other people may disagree with us on this point, they
may think the company's growth was due to economies of
scale, but this is why we think that's wrong."
Heidt: I would have been bothered if they were more ambitious
about policy implications.
Stake: Indeed, I like the hesitation to come to any conclusion.
One of the great lessons in the book is that there are a lot of
things that you didn't understand when you thought you understood the problem. (Laughter)
Heidt: Part of this difference, I think, is that Ken really believes
in this strategic stuff as a guide to policymaking in antitrust,
and I don't. I think the idea of strategic behavior is like a 600foot home run. You can imagine it, but it happens so rarely
that one would be foolish to give it any policy implications. 10
My sense reading this, with its very watered-down and
modest tone, was that the authors may have been reacting
against Richard Posner's (1973) style, which was unbelievably
ambitious. Still, Posner's ambitious, if not arrogant, style kept
the reader with him, and made his work very appealing, even
though he was faulted for years for being unduly ambitious in
his policy implications.
Dau-Schmidt: Are there particular technical or substantive issues
that you'd like to discuss?
Alexeev: I would like to add one comment to Jeff's first remark.
It is true that some material in this book is fairly difficult and
perhaps the authors did not always provide enough information to understand it properly. However, some of the gametheoretic concepts, especially various refinements of equilibria, are indeed quite difficult, and I think the authors should
be commended for explaining some of these very difficult
9 The words in the text are not a literal quote, only a summary of the authors'
sentiment.
10 Extending this baseball metaphor, Ken and Jeff think this example shows that
Bob's position is in deep right field.
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concepts without resorting to mathematics beyond algebra.
The explanations did often require quite intricate and sophisticated reasoning, but I would think that this is the kind
of reasoning at which lawyers are actually good.
Rasmusen: Mike is absolutely right. The book's hard, but lawyers
think this way anyway. They are used to hypotheticals, so
they're going to accept the style of "Here are our assumptions. What do they imply?" They are also willing to read
slowly. Students will have more of a problem, because they
read too fast, and because there aren't problem sets. Anyone
teaching out of this book should realize that students have to
work out numerical problems, so the teacher should change
some of the numbers in the book's examples and have the
students work out what happens in the model that results.
That would force the student to be thorough.
Dau-Schmidt: Bob, what do you think?
Heidt: I kept finding that the sections of the book on subject
areas I am most familiar with-for example, torts-left me
most unsatisfied but the sections on areas I knew nothing
about-for example, bankruptcy-were just wonderful."I For
instance on pages 18-23 the book claims that the three tort
liability approaches of strict liability with a defense of contributory negligence, negligence with a defense of contributory
negligence, and comparative negligence all work equally well
because they induce the cheapest precaution-taker to take
care. But since at least the late 1980s, tort scholars have convincingly agreed that these approaches only work equally-well
in the alternative care situation-that is, the situation where
the ideal solution is for only one party to take care. The approaches do not work equally well, by a long shot, in the joint
care situation, where the ideal solution requires that both
parties take care (Shavell 1987). That misstatement ought to
raise an eyebrow or two.
Dau-Schmidt: What about the areas of the book that you appreciated?
Heidt: As I said, I liked the bankruptcy part. I wasn't aware of
game theory's contribution to bankruptcy law or its use with
respect to plant closings or some of the signaling materials.
So when I read that, I was very impressed. When I got to an
area I know, like antitrust, and read the discussion on oligopoly, I thought it very standard. I thought that they just, flat
out, applied the standard oligopoly model to antitrust that
has been around at least 25 years.
My different reactions to the parts where I know the subject matter and the parts where I don't remind me of the
11 It is worth noting that Baird and Picker are most celebrated for their work on
bankruptcy. See Baird & Picker (1991).
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story about the anarchist, Proudhon, who was famous in the
19th century in Germany and in France for being a philosopher and economist.1 2 But as my history professor at Wisconsin, Harvey Goldberg, used to tell me, if you looked closer,
you noticed that in Germany, where they had a great tradition of philosophy and were very conversant with it, he was
famous as an economist. Everyone dismissed him as a philosopher. In France, where a long logical tradition left academics at least conversant with economics, at least as it existed in
the 19th century, they thought Proudhon a very impressive
philosopher but they knew he was worthless as an economist.
Now that's an overstatement, but that story about Proudhon
came to mind when I was reading this.
Dau-Schmidt Did other people have a similar reaction?
Alexeev: Perhaps that's why I liked the book quite a bit. I am
neither a lawyer nor a game theorist.
Rasmusen: I liked best the things I knew best, not because I
thought they were always right, but because I found them
stimulating, even the flaws.
Dau-Schmidt: Why did you find them stimulating?
Rasmusen: Oh, because I saw blind spots and realized, "Ah,
here's something crucial I hadn't realized was so important."
Stake: I think I can use something I leamed from the book to
criticize the book. Pages 177 and 178 discuss the Federal
Trade Commission case against Du Pont and the three other
producers of lead antiknock compounds, a discussion which I
was pleased to see because I was the associate on Du Pont's
briefs when the case went to the Second Circuit.1 3 The Court
overturned the FTC's finding of illegal behavior.
The authors' game theory model shows nicely that these
industry practices may lead to an anticompetitive or inefficient result, from which the authors suggest the court
reached the wrong conclusion. What the book doesn't say is
that the Court was not asked to decide whether the practices
were anticompetitive or inefficient. The statutory issue was
whether the practices were "unfair methods of competition."
The Court decided, partly on precedent and partly on the
legislative history (see Federal Trade Commission 1949), that
they weren't unfair under the Act, although they might reduce competition. In 1948, the FTC had attempted in Triangle Conduit (1948) to establish that consciously parallel pricing could violate section 5 without any collusion between the
producers. The FTC argued that the economic effect of identical prices achieved through consciously parallel action is
the same as that of similar prices achieved through overt col12 For an example of Proudhon's work, see Proudhon 1849. For a discussion of

Proudhon's significance in academic history, see Ehrenberg 1996.
13 E. 1. Du Pont de Nemours & Co. V. FTC (1984).
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lusion. The Seventh Circuit bought the FTC position. Congress then reacted with a great deal of activity, and that activity indicated that Congress did not approve the FTC position.
So the Second Circuit in the subsequent Du Pont case may
have done the right thing in the game it's playing, which is
the larger game of following precedent and congressional intent. The book describes the embedded game but not the
larger context.
Heidt: Well, I guess I disagree with you, Jeff. I'm familiar with the
case too. I was in the Antitrust Division when it was decided.
(Laughter) The first paragraph on page 178 described the
case adequately. Yes, the Court said the basis for defendants'
victory was that no agreement had been reached. I thought
that was a very unsatisfactory result, because it showed a failure to appreciate how, in light of game theory, oligopolistic
coordination could yield the very same bad result that an explicit price fixing agreement would yield.
Stake: But that's the point I started with. Congress did not prohibit all practices yielding bad results. Congress did not consider parallel pricing without collusion unfair, whatever its
economic effect.
Heidt: For these authors to make that last point sends the
message that game theory might be fine for academics, but
it's not going to influence courts because courts are going to
do some arbitrary legal thing, like follow a stupid legislative
history. And, therefore, learning about game theory won't really empower you as a lawyer, because the judge won't listen
to your arguments. The judge isn't interested in what's proor anticompetitive, the judge is just this brainless automaton
following pretty brainless legislation. This point doesn't enhance the value of game theory.
Dau-Schmidt: Listening to you two, I wonder if I'm the one who
should be teaching antitrust. (Laughter)
I guess my reaction wasn't quite as negative as Bob's. I
agree with him that the book was perhaps more interesting in
the areas that I didn't know as much about. I, too, was taken
with the section on bankruptcy law. In the section on labor
law, I have some qualifications. They correctly state that one
of the primary purposes of the National Labor Relations
Act 14 is to avoid strikes, but then they go on and present a
model in which strikes never happen, obviously unrealistic on
its face. On the other hand, I appreciated their attempt to
apply Rubinstein's (1982) bargaining theory to labor law.
That's something you don't see every day. This was not just
some traditional application of the monopoly theory of unions; they attempted to apply Rubinstein's bargaining theory
14 29 U.S.C.S. § 151 et

seq.
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to both the Burns case 15 and the MacKay doctrine 16-the
problems of employer successorship and the permanent replacement of strikers-from this perspective. Even though I
think it's an early step in the application of game theory to
labor law, I appreciated it.
Dau-Schmidt: Are there other perspectives on the policy implications of the book or game theory in general?
Rasmusen: I think the authors present game theory models
which, given their assumptions, are logically correct, but the
reader can easily make too much of these models for policy
purposes. A good example is their discussion, on page 134, of
mandatory parental leave laws-laws that require employers
to grant parental leave to employees rather than leaving it
open as a subject for mutual negotiation. They build a good
model, and conclude that maybe the law can be justified.
They say "maybe" rather than "is," but readers may not notice. The problem is that although their technical argument
is correct, almost the same model but with one different parameter value can lead to the opposite conclusion-that no
employer should be allowed to grant parental leave.
I'll go through this in some detail to show what I mean.
As the authors explain, if parental leave is a clear benefit to
all workers, the government does not have to require it, because employers will include it voluntarily as a fringe benefit.
The problem is that if parental leave reduces productivity,
then if it is included as a fringe benefit, wages must be reduced correspondingly, and some or all workers may not like
that tradeoff. Moreover-and this is what the book focuses
on-if the employer allows workers to tailor their own employment contracts, so any worker who wishes can accept a
lower wage in exchange for a parental leave clause, the employer can see who accepts the lower wage and harm that
worker's future prospects with the company. This would happen if workers who intend to have families and care for them
are less productive on the job. Foreseeing that their promotion chances will be harmed, it may happen that no worker
will dare accept the parental leave clause, even if a majority of
them want it, and the employer is no wiser than before as to
which workers are less productive. This is inefficient, and it
would be better for the government simply to mandate that
all workers accept the lower wage and the parental leave
clause (pp. 142-47).
Now change one assumption. Assume that workers who
intend to have families and care for them are more productive
on the job, not less. In that case, workers who reject the fam15 NLRB v. Burns InternationalSecuriy Services (1972).
16

NLRB v. MacKay Radio & Telegraph Co. (1938).
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ily leave clause are the ones who reveal something about
themselves and harm their promotion chances. It may happen that every worker accepts the parental leave clause, even
though very few want it, because no worker wants to reveal
his low productivity via his distaste for children. This is inefficient, and it would be better for the government simply to
mandate that no worker be allowed to accept the parental
leave clause.
Both stories are logically consistent, but they differ in one
starting assumption. Perhaps even more important, they both
neglect the bigger game of public policy, the game in which
pressure groups lobby the government to take wealth away
from one person and give it to another. In view of that larger
game, the best policy might be to oppose government action
in the area of labor contracts altogether, from fear that any
government action is going to be motivated by selfish special
interests.
Heidt Eric, your discussion of the family leave law upsets me because you game theorists are too quick to conclude that a
strategic or information problem will lead to market failure.
If family leave is an efficient term because it benefits workers
more than it costs employers, it's likely to shoulder its way
into the employment contract somehow even though employees, fearful of signaling something bad about themselves,
are unwilling to ask for it.
One way would be for some employer sooner or later to
adopt the term for some reason, say, because a union asked
for it or because the employer thought it would be a nice
idea or a neat experiment. Whatever the reason, the employer would then discover that the term more than pays for
itself in employee happiness. Word will get around about
how worthwhile the term is. Rival employers will then offer
the term rather than suffer the employee unrest resulting
from them not doing so. And the term will become customary.
As the chaos theory scientist played by Jeff Goldblum in
JurassicPark said, "Efficient terms will find a way." I know he
said "life," but I'm sure he meant "efficient terms." (Laughter)
Efficient terms will find some way to manifest themselves, to
show their efficiency. The problems of private nonverifiable
information offer a plausible explanation for why efficient
terms may not always be embraced. But that's all. No policymaker should rely on markets falling so easily.
Stake: Bob, that's the whole point of game theory: efficient terms
don't always find a way.
Rasmusen: It's easy to say that efficiency always wins out, but that
doesn't happen automatically. Maybe Bob's right that employers would offer the term instead of employees asking for
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it, but I'd need a formal model to be sure it would work. Adding realistic twists to the model is how game theory makes
progress.
Dau-Schmidt: If strategic behavior is a 600-foot home run, then I
guess it follows that market perfection is two female dinosaurs successfully procreating. (Laughter) Although the market is often a marvelous instrument for coordinating production and consumption, it is just that-an instrument of man's
creation and imperfect like all such devices. Market failure is
a very real phenomenon, for precisely the reasons illuminated by game theory. For example, why didn't the market
develop workers' compensation. It seems pretty obvious that
the employer is both the cheapest cost avoider for most industrial accidents and the most efficient insurer for a modest
level of compensation. Why didn't employers voluntarily assume this responsibility as a means of attracting employees?
Probably because employees don't adequately assess the risk
of harm from industrial accidents and so don't ask for sufficient compensatory wages to give their employers adequate
incentive to offer such insurance.
Similarly, why don't employees negotiate contracts limiting the amount of hazardous chemicals, for example, benzene, that they're exposed to. Surely it's important to them.
Such chemicals cause cancer and shorten your life. The problem, of course, is information and transaction costs combined with a public good problem. It's impossible for individual workers to discover and evaluate all the chemicals they
are exposed to and then negotiate and enforce contract
terms with respect to those chemicals. As a result it is neces- sary to evaluate and regulate such chemical exposure at a societal level rather than through individual bargaining. Indeed the traditional explanation for the existence of contract
law in law and economics is to "fill gaps" in contracts left by
individual bargaining due to transaction costs. Your blind
faith in this market deity seems to me quite naive.
Heidt. In any event, don't you think it's fair to say the authors
most display their rather liberal, prodemocratic, progovernment bias in their choice of examples? I think they're really
trying to signal liberal law professors that game theory can be
a nice device for them to support their liberal biases.
Rasmusen: That's an interesting point, but I think you don't have
it quite right. It isn't that the authors are liberal, though they
may be, but that game theory itself has an activist bias. The
conclusion of basic economics is usually that government action is not useful, so it is thrilling to find exceptions to that in
game theory. Game theorists are a little like judges. Even a
conservative judge is tempted to be an activist, because that's
where the most fun is. In the same way, academics want to
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change things, propose laws, make a name for themselves.
Game theory is wonderful because it provides all kinds of arguments for policy...
Alexeev: . . . sometimes contradictory arguments...
Rasmusen: ... and it may be even better that they're contradictory, because you can rationalize what you wanted to do anyway. That's the danger here. There's a kind of a pro-activist
bias here, but one more academic than political.
Dau-Schmidt: I didn't find this book a liberal book at all. I guess
it's just one's perspective.
Heidt: Is it fair to say that, compared to neoclassical economics,
the book's much more activist?
Dau-Schmidt I think any time you relax the assumptions of neoclassical model, as you do with game theory, you increase the
prospects for useful government intervention.
Rasmusen: I think it's a good thing to have this kind of law and
economics presented now, because law and economics in the
older style of Posner and Chicago generally leads to laissez
faire. A lot of people then just stop listening because they
don't like conservative policies, and they can't distinguish between conservatism and law and economics. Such people
should like game theory because it leads to more activist conclusions. I hope that when they like that part of law and economics, they'll come to see the value of the older style too.
Dau-Schmidt: I think this is an appropriate place to conclude our
discussion by addressing one final question. What do you
think this book has to contribute to the game-theoretic analysis of law, and what is the future of the game-theoretic analysis of law? Bob, do you want go first?
Heidt: Well, I think it's going to be a transition book because,
although game theory might have a lot to offer as an advanced law and economics course in law schools, this book
isn't going to be the one that starts opening up those courses.
It's not quite readable enough. I say the book's a transition
book because it's going to help somebody to come along and
write a book that's a counterpart for game theory to what
Posner's Economic Analysis of Law (1973) was for introductory
courses in law and economics. It's going to be a very readable
tour de force of all the arguments game theory allows in different fields. Once that book is written, I think game theory
will assume a more secure place in the law school curriculum.
Stake: The beauty of the book was its ability to show that legal
issues are complicated and that models we've worked out to
understand the effects of law might be wrong. The book's
models should make us hesitate to criticize judicial decisions
without investigation of empirical facts. What really will happen if the law says X or the law says Y? How will people respond to changes in the law? Too much in the past, legal

Dau-Schmidt, Rasmusen, Stake, Heidt, & Alexeev

627

analysis ignored behavioral consequences. Then law and economics came along and said, "If you have that law, the results
may be something you didn't want." Game theory pushes it
one step further saying, "Price theory predicts these behavioral effects, but game theory predicts a different set of results."
Rasmusen: Game theory and law has a big future, and this book
came out at exactly the right time. Just this winter I've been
asked by two different editors of surveys to write sections on
game theory and law, so it's attracting a lot of interest in the
scholarly world. 17 This book will be very useful, not so much
for students to read in class as for professors to read before
class.
Alexeev: Application of game theory to law has become a really
hot area, and presumably game theory will acquire much
wider application in legal analysis. But I would like to stress
again the point I made before. I don't think it's likely that
game theory will present us with striking new results. Rather I
think it will change the form of discussion and make it more
precise. Overall, I enjoyed reading the book very much. I am
glad it has appeared.
Stake: I would like to conclude by returning to the book's example of a law that requires employers to train all employees,
even those with bad backs for whom the training would not
adequately benefit the employers (see above p. 618).
Through this superb example, the authors show both (1)
that such a law might make no difference to who gets training because, without the law, workers would hide their bad
backs to get the training and (2) that the law might efficiently
allow employees with bad backs to signal their condition and
obtain more appropriate office chairs.
The authors set up-but leave to the reader the delight
of discovering-further implications of these points. For example, the employer bound by the law would probably criticize as absurdly inefficient a law forcing him to train workers
with bad backs. With the law in place, the employer would
know who had the bad backs but would be unaware that he
would not know that without the law. He does not realize that
the law requiring him to train all workers does not change
the world a bit, and he bridles at what appears to be a constraint placed on his business decisions. The very people who
might, supposedly, give a first-hand description of the effects
of the law on them, in reality, have no idea what the effects
are.
17 Eric declined both these entreaties. Jeff, on the other hand, foolishly accepted
assignments from both these same editors.
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Think of how we search for areas needing legislation. Law
reformers have long looked for bad behaviors to change. The
example makes a perverse suggestion: We should look at universal behaviors we do not want to change and see if there
might be any reasons to mandate those already universal behaviors.
Dau-Schmidt I'd have to agree with a lot what's been said. First
of all, I agree with Bob that I think that this book is a transition book. I can't remember a time when Bob and I have
agreed so much on a subject as this book. (Laughter) But I
would agree with him on that point. I think it's an important
book, as Mike and Eric and Jeff have established. I think that
game theory is a growing area of interest. You might even call
it the future of economic analysis of law, because it allows
one to relax the assumption that there isn't strategic behavior. There's tremendous potential for the use of game theory
in analyzing legal problems, and I'm hopeful that Baird et
al.'s book will facilitate further work in this area, but I think
the breakthrough book that really ignites interest in this subject is yet to be written.
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